What is justice?

In all the debates about “consequentialism,” and “intrinsic evil” and such, one topic that always seems skirted over is the definition of “justice” itself. Plato, in the Republic, defines justice as the removal of something from one person to satisfy the need of another, the leveling out of wrongs in society. Social justice involves removal of property from those who have an excess to satisfy the needs of the poor. Criminal justice involves removal of civil or even human rights from one person to compensate for rights that person took from another.

In a manner of speaking, it is always “intrinsically evil” to kill another human being. But, in certain cases, that act of killing is morally justifiable.

Theft is intrinsically evil, but taxation is basically justifiable theft.

It is against the Natural Law to take away another person’s freedom, but imprisonment is morally justified.

Often, the debate is limited merely to the justification of war or the death penalty or individual weapon ownership, but, really, almost every action of government, certainly every action we classify as “justice,” involves in some way practicing an intrinsic evil for a greater good.

One of the the operative phrases, as our Constitution and Declaration of Independence apply Natural Law, is “due process.” It is illicit to remove another person’s rights without “due process.”

Just actions involve due process (even if that due process is an immediate personal judgement call, which society later reviews to determien if it was licit). For example, if Detective Lou S. Cannon shoots a perp in haste, because the perp, now victim, held what appeared to be a gun, the Internal Affairs review may decide that it was *not* legitimate self-defense.

President W.R. Hawk may convince the country that a war is justified, but the world community may decide, after the fact, that the war was not justified.

Due process, both before and after the fact, are key.

But if you looked at every action in which government applies justice, you will find *some* action that is intrinsically evil.

There is also the question of culpability, as opposed to justification: as when the extreme circumstances remove a person of a moral choice. This was, to his credit, the argument the President of the Pontifical Academy for Life tried to make in regard to the Btazilian excommunications, but he didn’t have all the facts of the case.

The Church acknowledges there are situations when we may be forced to commit an action that is intrinsically evil or involves an intrinsic evil, but we do not really want to. It may not even be so drastic: perhaps addiction or psychological issues impede one’s ability to make a clear moral choice. In such cases, a person is not culpable for the intrinsic evil chosen, and not guilty of mortal sin (though perhaps of venial sin).

On the other hand, when a person is faced with a situation where moral judgement is impeded or taken away, or when a person faces a situation that would involve the just application of an otherwise intrinsic evil, and that person practices heroic virtue.

A woman who has a serious health problem while pregnant and declines medical treatment that might harm the baby, when the Church says it is licit to have such treatment, is not being scrupulous, she’s being heroically virtuous.
If a person is faced with a situation of self-defense and, rather than fighting back, turns the other cheek or gives the stolen silver as a gift, tha tperson is being heroically virtuous.